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How Skeptical is QuineÕs ÒModal SkepticismÓ? 
John Divers 
Abstract 
 
Following a logistical explication of metaphysics Quine can be cast as an 
ideological antirealist about modality. However, it is not clear that Quine deserves 
to be called a modal skeptic since, I argue, he does not hold some of the extreme 
views about modality that are often associated with him. Moreover, while QuineÕs 
convictions about truth make many forms of antirealism unacceptable to him, he 
might be construed as a non-skeptical modal quasi-realist (a la Blackburn). I 
suggest further that the application of this paradigm to metaphysical necessity 
might proceed from the association of that concept with those explored in 
QuineÕs ÒNatural KindsÓ. 
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¤I: The Logistical Explication of Modal Metaphysics 
 
There is an ingenuous and sanguine conception of metaphysics that has 
regained the status of orthodoxy in our time even though it looks back, beyond 
Kant, to Aristotle and his precursors. In the old and new orthodoxy of classical, 
unreconstructed metaphysics, we aim to characterize systematically how things 
fundamentally are (independently of our conception of them): or, giving even 
free(r) reign to metaphor, to carve reality at the joints. Skepticism about this 
classical metaphysical project is a prominent element of the empiricist tradition. 
In the most extreme examples of empiricist skepticism, the positivists (logical or 
otherwise) aim to bury such metaphysics. But moderate empiricist skepticism 
regards the burial as premature, while also refusing to praise classical 
metaphysics in its unreconstructed form. It is on this moderate, and revisionary, 
part of the spectrum of empiricist skepticism about classical metaphysics that we 
find Quine, as I understand him. To borrow a term from his mentor Carnap (1947, 
8), QuineÕs aim is to explicate Ò metaphysicsÓ rather than to eliminate it. As 
sense-making animals and charitable interpreters of our ancestors Ð we 
understand classical metaphysics, and its practitioners, best by treating it as a 
proto-scientific project. Explication requires that we establish continuity between 
that which is pre-scientific (old and inferior) and that which is scientific (new and 
superior). The crucial dimension of continuity is not that of doctrine, nor that of 
method but, rather, that of aim. And the continuing aim that enables the 
explication of the classical metaphysical project, by affording a reconstruction 
entirely within science, is (broadly) this: to offer the optimal general and 
systematic characterization of all that there is and how it is. As such an explicator 
of classical metaphysics, Quine finds himself able to share with the classical 
metaphysician a common language in which one can meaningfully speak of, and 
properly dispute, for example: the existence of natural numbers, the nature of 
attributes and Ð to bring us to our present topic Ð the presence of modal features 
in reality. 
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The Quinean method of explicating classical metaphysics is logistical: we 
proceed by transforming questions in the material mode (those about numbers, 
attributes, modal features of reality etc.) into questions in the formal mode (those 
about symbols). When the logistical method is applied to explicate that part of 
metaphysics that is ontology, wherein Quine is anticipated by Frege (1884), 
questions about the existence of given objects such as numbers are, of course, 
not to be taken as equivalent to questions about the existence of the relevant 
symbols (numerals). The logistical approach is methodological rather than 
reductive: it guides us towards the appropriate symbols and the kinds of question 
about them that we have to answer in order to establish knowledge of what there 
is, and of how things are, beyond the symbols. A logistical explication of ontology 
has two elements. The first element is the identification of (what I shall call) the 
telling discourse. This tells us where to look to settle questions of ontology. The 
second element is the proposal of a particular syntactic criterion that is to be 
applied to the telling discourse. This tells us how to find there that which is is 
ontologically significant.  
 
QuineÕs earlier and lesser-known paper on the explication of ontology, originally 
published in 1939, has a title that makes explicit his endorsement of this method 
Ð that is: ÒA Logistical Approach to the Ontology ProblemÓ (1976a)1. The 
application of the method comes to maturity in its more famous successor, 
originally published in 1948,  ÒOn What There IsÓ (1953a). Quine takes the 
ontologically telling discourse to be the optimal formulation of best total science. 
Optimality is primarily a matter of simplicity in various respects. and the 
deployment of a canonical notation whose terms are primitive (not further 
definable). Beyond this, I will not explore further the scholarly question of exactly 
                                                
1 Where a reference is given without an attached name (as here with Ò(1976a)Ó) it 
corresponds to the item in the bibliography given for Quine (here, ÒQuine 
(1976a)Ó). 
 
  
4 
what Quine takes to make for the optimal formulation of best total science. I shall 
simply label this discourse, the one that Quine supposes to be ontologically 
telling, as ÒBest TheoryÓ. To complete the logistical explication of the ontological 
question, and departing from the method of his logistical precursor Frege, Quine 
proposes to apply to Best Theory the syntactical criterion of discerning the 
predicates that characterize the bound variables of (existential) quantification. To 
be, following logistical explication, is to be the value of a bound variable: and for 
FÕs to be is for Ò∃xFxÓ  to be a conjunct of Best Theory (which, qua Best Theory, 
we take to be true). 
 
This logistical approach to questions of ontology is, I believe, intended by Quine 
to be extended (mutatis mutandis) to the explication of those further questions of 
classical metaphysics that lie beyond the realm of the ontological. Those are 
questions of how things are rather than questions of what things there are and 
Quine (1951) characterizes this complement of ontology as ideology. The items 
of vocabulary that exhaust ontological interest are the variables, the quantifiers 
that bind them and the variables that characterize them. To prosecute ideological 
questions we look to the further items of the vocabulary  of Best Theory an, in 
particular, to its connectives and operators. For Quine, then, as I understand him, 
the crucial question of modal metaphysics is the ideological question of whether 
there are primitive modal aspects of reality. And that question is rendered 
respectable and tractable under explication, by transformation into the question 
whether any modal operators or connectives figure in Best Theory. This question 
may be simplified and made more tractable by stipulation. While there may be, in 
other contexts, good and interesting questions about how we demarcate 
vocabulary as modal, and which vocabulary thereby counts as modal, these 
questions are not presently germane. All parties to the dispute on which we focus 
stipulate to the question being about the credentials for inclusion in the 
formulation of Best Theory of the sentential necessity operator (the box) of 
standard quantified modal logic (QML). It is further stipulated that the necessity 
operator will be a feature of Best Theory if and only if its presence there is 
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supported by the further inclusion within Best Theory of axioms for (some version 
of) QML. By making the question tractable in this way, we put aside the question 
whether commitment to modal features of reality might be established by the 
presence in Best Theory of other kinds of modal vocabulary. And that is to be 
acknowledged as a very important matter. However, for present purposes, and 
reflecting the dialectical context in which Quine conducted his campaign, QuineÕs 
engagement with the metaphysics of modality is taken to be exhausted by the 
question whether quantified modal logic (QML) merits a place in Best Theory.  
 
QuineÕs answer to that question is not in doubt: it is that QML does not merit a 
place in Best Theory. Consequently, as I understand Quine, when we join in the 
argot of classical metaphysics, the right things to say about modality are rather 
straightforwardly Òanti-realisticÓ in the ideological sphere: reality has no primitively 
modal aspects; modality is not metaphysically fundamentally; modality is not real; 
modal distinctions do not carve nature at the joints, etc. But such broadly 
Humean pronouncements do not obviously sustain by themselves the 
characterization of the ideological modal antirealists who make them as modal 
skeptics. No-one, as far as I know, characterizes the ideological modal antirealist 
Lewis (1986), for example, as a modal skeptic. So, I shall take it, if Quine 
deserves to be characterized as a modal ÒskepticÓ it must be because his 
complaints against QML and its modal operators are deeper or more radical than 
those of others who are merely antirealistic and not, further, skeptics. Of course, 
ultimately the label (ÒskepticÓ) is not what is important. But by claiming this basis 
for its use we can address via the question whether Quine was really a moal 
skeptic the substantive matter of the nature and depth of his complaints against 
QML and its modal operators. I will try to show that characterization of Quine as 
a modal skeptic is based on misunderstanding of the ultimate nature of his 
complaint against QML. I will then try to illustrate how there is live potential in 
QuineÕs modal philosophy Ð potential that has been ignored by those who have 
dismissed QuineÕs modal philosophy on the grounds that Ð qua modal skepticism 
Ð it cannot have anything to offer. 
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PART II: QuineÕs Modal ÒSkepticismÓ: Two Canards 
 
I conjecture that there are two (related) theses that are commonly associated 
with Quine and in which the distinctive, radical and skeptical character of his 
philosophy of modality have largely been supposed to consist. The first thesis is 
that the characteristic construction of QML, ÒÒ∃x£FxÓ, and cognate locutions, are 
unintelligible.2 The second is that QML is in certain ways semantically defective Ð 
ways in which it was subsequently shown not to be defective by developments in 
possible-worlds semantics.3 I do not believe that Quine endorsed either of these 
theses. Indeed, I believe that there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Quine 
held views on these matters that involve significant qualification or rejection of 
the theses in question.  
 
II.1 Unintelligibility4 
                                                
2 Thus, for example, we have this recent passage written by a highly influential 
contemporary philosopher of modality. ÒQuineÕs skepticism has not stood the 
test of time. By any normal scientific standard, it is intelligible to say that …. 
there are things that could have dissolved in water. To condemn such 
statements as unintelligible by some special philosophical standard is bad 
science and bad philosophy. Books on modality have no […]obligation to 
spend their readersÕ time on defences of the intelligibility of modal 
discourse[…]Ó. (Williamsom 2013, xi)  
3 Thus, for example, we have this recent commentary. ÒAfter all, it was the desire 
to reject the skepticism of their professor that drove Saul Kripke and David Lewis, 
QuineÕs students, each to formulate a semantics of de re modal expressions and 
a theory of possible worldsÓ Borghini (2016, 57). 
4 Some of the ground of this section is covered at greater length in Divers (2017). 
For earlier commentary in the same spirit, with different emphases, see also 
Burgess (2008). 
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The first canard about QuineÕs modal skepticism is that he claimed that the 
characteristic construction of QML, ÒÒ∃x£FxÓ, was unintelligible tout court. Quine 
did not claim that: rather, his much further qualified position was, in summary, as 
follows.5 What is not obviously intelligible is the characteristic construction when 
we bring to its understanding the conceptions of quantification and modality Òas 
ordinarily understoodÓ. By quantification Òas ordinarily understoodÓ, Quine meant 
quantification that is of first-order and taken to range over the familiar objects of 
science: sets, physical objects (and various ÒcongeriesÓ of these, such as atoms 
tables and mountains).  By modality Òas ordinarily understoodÓ, Quine meant that 
the relevant necessity would be (explained in terms of some variant of) 
analyticity: for that was how QuineÕs intended dialectical opponents approached 
matters. The combination of modality so understood with quantification so 
understood really does, I think, threaten absolute unintelligibility. That is because 
the construction, Ò∃x£FxÓ, appears to introduce the value of x initially only as x 
qua thing, independently of any non-trivial mode of presentation, and then says 
(in effect) of this thing that it is analytically F. Yet analyticity is a matter of 
meaning, so is the idea that x is F as a matter of meaning alone? But a matter of 
the meaning of what? Surely not the meaning of the object that is the value of x, 
for the intended values do not, in general, have meanings. Surely not the 
meaning of the predicate ÒFÓ? ÒFÓ has a meaning but how can its meaning 
interact with something that is not (or does not have) a meaning to produce truth 
in virtue of meaning alone. No. Intelligibility requires that something has to give, 
and there are only two basic strategies: either our understanding of the 
quantification, or our understanding of the modality must be reconfigured.  
 
The first strategy for establishing the intelligibility of, Ò∃x£FxÓ, is to stick with the 
                                                
5 I present here a narrative derived from the classic sources ÒReference and 
ModalityÓ (1953b) and  ÒThree Grades of Modal InvolvementÓ (1976b). For more 
detailed references see Divers (2017). 
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understanding of modality in terms of analyticity while departing from our ordinary 
conception of quantification as ranging over the ÒextensionalÓ entities with which 
we are familiar. According to (1953b, 28-31), this Fregean strategy, suggested or 
adopted in different forms by Church, Carnap and the Lewis of old, is to construe 
modal contexts as introducing quantification over (and/or reference to) sense-like 
(and non-extensional) entities. The early (1943) complaint against this strategy 
was, predictably enough, that it relied on dubious ontology: the intended values 
of quantificational variables lack tolerably clear criteria of identity. Crucially, 
however, the later Quine does not rest his case on this point. The mature 
complaint (1953b, 28-31) is that the Fregean strategy is demonstrably ineffective: 
it fails even if, for the sake of argument, we allow that the notion of analyticity is 
in perfectly good standing and that one may appeal to that notion in order to 
supply adequate criteria of identity for whatever extraordinary entities are 
postulated. The heart of the ineffectiveness proof is a lemma to this effect: that 
the language in which we quantify over the sense-like entities would have to be 
such that it never affords distinct ways of specifying a variable value one of which 
produces an analytically necessary truth and the other an analytically contingent 
truth. Quine then demonstrates that a language can be so only if we take all (or 
none) of its true sentences to be analytically necessary, thus rendering modal 
distinctions vacuous and pointless. 
 
The second strategy Ð and now the only live strategy Ð for establishing the 
intelligibility of, Ò∃x£FxÓ, is to stick with our ordinary conception of quantification 
as ranging over the ÒextensionalÓ entities with which we are familiar while 
departing from the understanding of modality in terms of analyticity. Such a 
modality would be as it is ingenuously presented at the primal de re modal scene 
Ò∃x£FxÓ: it would be a matter of (the variable value) x having in itself, or only qua 
x, an ÒattributeÓ F, necessarily and with the values of x as ordinarily understood. 
So physical objects, sets (and congeries of these) would also be such that: (i) 
some but not all x would satisfy F; (ii) among those, some y would satisfy £F and 
others z not so and (iii) all of that would be perfectly in order without regard to 
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any consideration about the mode of presentation of the values of x, y, z [(1953b, 
¤III);1976b, ¤III)]. It would have been useful for Quine to have had to hand a label 
for modality, so ÒextraordinarilyÓ understood. And since Quine had already made 
it clear (1976b, ¤I)) that he was interested in a logic of absolute modality rather 
than one of restricted or local modality (causal, physical etc.) it, I think we can 
see that the future supplied that label. Thus, I shall say, that Quine is thinking Ð 
at this stage in the dialectic Ð that the only chance that QML has of being 
intelligible and of expressing non-trivial modal distinctions is if it is taken as the 
logic of a metaphysical modality. One can even imagine Quine having been 
tempted by the term but having disciplined himself to forego it, lest it seem like a 
cheap pejorative thrown in for rhetorical effect. In any event, for immediate 
purposes, no more should be read into the present use of the adjective, 
ÒmetaphysicalÓ, than that it is a label for an absolute modality that satisfies the 
conjunction of (i)-(iii) above.  
 
What, then, is QuineÕs assessment of the standing of necessity and the 
quantified logic of modality, now that their joint viability is revealed as dependent 
squarely on the understanding of the modality as metaphysical? It cannot be 
emphasized enough that QuineÕs objection to QML at this stage in the dialectic is 
of a quite different nature to any complaints or concerns that have figured so far. 
We are no longer at an impasse of unintelligibility as we were when confronted 
with the primal de re modal scene and bound to understand both modality and 
quantification as we ÒordinarilyÓ would. There, recall, the prospect was of a 
condition that could be (not just logically but) analytically true of a thing in itself, 
independently of any mode of presentation. Nor are we in a position to 
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the appeal to the surviving strategy of appeal 
to metaphysical necessity, as we were in the case of the Fregean attempt to 
combine an analytic understanding of necessity with an extraordinary account of 
the domain of quantification. The nature of QuineÕs objection to QML at this point 
is different and, ultimately, simple. The objection is that the quantified logic of 
metaphysical modality brings such costs that optimal scientific Theory can only 
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be Best without it: the only intelligible version of QML has no place in Best 
Theory. 
 
The exploration of an objection of this nature will naturally proceed through a 
sequence of questions. What did Quine take the commitments of sustaining QML 
to be? Was Quine right about these being commitments of sustaining QML? Why 
did Quine think of these commitments, negatively, as costs? Was Quine right to 
think that the sum of the costs makes them prohibitive? And in each case, of 
course, there will be a question of dialectical perspective. Is there room to allow 
an answer to the question from one who is pre-disposed to QML that differs from 
that likely to be given by one who is not so disposed? Present limitations of 
space prohibit a thorough exploration of this nature. So I shall be selective in 
dealing with only some aspects of the matter. 
 
Quine (1953b, 1976b) enumerates three commitments that flow from sustaining 
QML under the constraints that apply at this juncture. The first commitment is to 
a particular matter of modal doctrine Ð that is, to a particular version of the 
principle of the necessity of identity: Ò∃x£FxÓ:  The second commitment is logical: 
it is to a version of first-order, non-modal logic, in which the practice, methods 
and applications become variously more complicated and restricted in order that 
it might support a modal extension. The third commitment is a metaphysical 
commitment to a doctrine that Quine identifies as Aristotelian Essentialism. In the 
remainder of this paper, it is only to the alleged commitment to, and costs of, 
Aristotelian Essentialism that direct and significant attention will be paid. My 
strategy will be simply claim the label ÒAristotelian EssentialismÓ for the doctrine 
that there are fundamental and appropriately discriminating truths of 
metaphysical necessity as it has been characterized above. The truths in 
question will be fundamental because they are expressed in the canonical 
notation of Best Theory. The truths in question will be appropriately 
discriminating in ways already accounted for: they will not entail that all of an 
individualÕs attributes are attached to it of necessity nor will they be conceived so 
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that the truths of metaphysical necessity are co-extensive with those of analytic 
necessity.6  
 
Famously, or infamously, Quine does very little to justify his view that 
commitment to the metaphysics of Aristotelian Essentialism. In the immediate 
dialectical context of (1953b), in particular, Quine sees no need to do so, since 
he has in mind there broadly logical empiricist interlocutors (Church, Carnap etc.) 
who are bound to agree immediately that such a commitment is unwelcome. So 
some construction is required of what Quine would say next when challenged to 
provide reasons for counting commitment to Aristotelian Essentialism as a cost.   
 
¤II.2 HereÕs WhatÕs Wrong With Good, Old-Fashioned Aristotelian Essentialism 
 
Here I construct a broad dilemma on QuineÕs behalf. Either we treat the 
commitment to Aristotelian essentialism as a product of an unexplicated 
metaphysics or as a product of an explicated metaphysics. If the commitment is 
one that is generated from the practice of unreconstructed, unexplicated 
metaphysics then, as such, it has no intellectually respectable justification. The 
commitment to Aristotelian Essentialism would be epistemologically indefensible. 
If the commitment is one that is generated from the practice of explicated 
metaphysics, then that is the right way to make it epistemologically defensible: 
                                                
6 In claiming the term ÒAristotelian EssentialismÓ, for this purpose, Quine joined in 
an orthodoxy that long prevailed by presuming the interchangeability of the 
characterizations of Ò£Ó as essentiality and as metaphysically necessity. This will 
strike the student of recent essentialism, e.g. of Fine (1994), and perhaps also 
the students of Aristotle, as a gauche conflation Ð there being more to 
essentiality than metaphysical necessity. However, it is enough for our purposes 
that at least some of what Aristotelians take to be properly essential is also a 
mater of metaphysical necessity. 
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but only if one is further prepared to defend the place of essentialist locutions in 
Best Theory. Yet, that is a commitment to defend the place of essentialist 
locutions in the optimal formulation of total science, and that Ð in its most obvious 
form Ð would be a commitment to defend the scientific viability, and desirability, 
of the reformulation of doctrines of relativity and quantum mechanics in the 
language of Aristotelian (potentialist) theories of matter and motion (made 
systematic by the presence of the devices of QML).7  
 
I am confident that this, in broad outline, is the core of QuineÕs argument from the 
unacceptability of Aristotelian Essentialism to the unacceptablility of QML. Four 
salient strategies then emerge for resisting the rejection of Aristotelian 
Essentialist metaphysics. The first strategy involves defending (the 
epistemological authority of) the project of unexplicated metaphysics. The 
second strategy involves a defending the place of a QML-regimented version of 
(broadly) Aristotelian science in Best Theory. The third strategy involves 
defending an approach to metaphysics that is explicatory but non-logistical. The 
remaining strategies involve defending a logistical explication of metaphysics that 
departs from QuineÕs version either: (the fourth) in its conception of the 
appropriate syntactic criteria or (the fifth) in the discourse it identifies as 
(metaphysically) telling. This very last strategic prospect, in particular, is likely to 
appeal to many. For it appears to allow the construction of a case, under the 
aegis of explicated metaphysics, for ideological modal realism. Such a case 
would be constructed by establishing for appropriate modal locutions (those that 
articulate Aristotelian Essentialism and are regimented in QML) a role in a 
discourse that is, resolutely, scientific but broader than Best Theory. There is no 
                                                
7 That there is a connection in QuineÕs thinking, between the acceptability of QML 
and the acceptability of Aristotelian science, is a point that has been made by 
various commentators: see, e.g., Hylton (2007, 354). Here, I attempt to allocate 
to that element of QuineÕs thinking a precise role in a comprehensive case 
against the acceptability of QML. 
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case to answer against the intelligibility of such a discourse. For as has been 
emphasized, Quine has not argued that the distinction between attributes had of 
necessity and attributes had contingently (absolutely so and independently of 
description) is one that is unintelligible, unserviceable, outr or otherwise beyond 
the pale of reason. I shall return in ¤III, to the matter of a Quinean appraisal of 
the role of essentialist locutions in such a broader scientific discourse. 
 
II.2 Possible-Worlds Semantics 
 
The second canard about QuineÕs Ò modal skepticismÓ has him claiming that 
QML was semantically or meta-logically defective, and subsequently being 
refuted by the development of possible-worlds semantic for QML by Kripke (and 
others).8  
 
While QuineÕs classical critique of QML emerged at a time, 1953, prior to the 
appearance of an interpretation of QML, he never claimed any of the following: 
(a) that a meta-logically adequate interpretation of QML could not be provided; 
(b) that de re modal locutions were unintelligible pending such an interpretation; 
(c) that (for that reason or any other) the presence or absence of such an 
interpretation was crucial to the acceptability of QML; (d) that the commitment he 
                                                
8 Here, I add two observations. Firstly, had Kripke thought this appraisal worthy, 
one might expect that he would not have been slow to (realize and) advertise the 
Quine-refuting power of his achievements. That did not happen. Secondly, 
another tall tale has it that a refutation of QuineÕs objections to QML was 
achieved by Smullyan (1948) or by a combination of Smullyan and Kripke. For 
commentary on the role of Smullyan (1948) in QuineÕs case against QML see, 
again, Burgess (2008) and Divers (2017). Briefly, Quine thought SmullyanÕs 
contribution was part and parcel of the defence of QML by appeal to a 
metaphysical modality.  
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discerned to Aristotelian essentialism turned on any logical or metalogical feature 
of QML nor, therefore (e) that the commitment he discerned to Aristotelian 
essentialism was hostage to the fortunes of whatever versions of QML would 
best fit a future metalogical interpretation. Quine explicitly acknowledged in 1972 
(the original publication date of the remarks in (1981a, 173-4) KripkeÕs results in 
proving adequate (relativized) validity-conditions for QML formulas and the 
ensuing completeness proofs for various systems of QML. These are results 
delivered by a thoroughly general and metaphysically neutral theory of models 
for QML Ð results that involve no appeal to a special case of an intended model 
or an intended interpretation. What Quine acknowledges here is often called the 
ÒpureÓ Kripke semantics for QML, as per Plantinga (1974). But QuineÕs concerns 
with what are, if you will, the ÒsemanticÓ aspects of QML were focused entirely on 
the intended interpretation of its sentences: about what kinds of statements were 
apt to be held true (and telling) by one who would insist on a logic of 
metaphysical modality. But those concerns have already been accounted for 
under the different heading of commitment to the philosophical doctrine of 
Aristotelian essentialism. All that changed in this matter post-Kripke, was, as 
Quine emphasized, that there emerged a meta-linguistic and non-homophonic 
way of articulating essentialist commitments. That was the way of making certain 
claims of transworld identity Ð claims to the effect that: one and the same 
individual, x, exists at two distinct (metaphysically) possible worlds, w and v, 
while having some attributes at both worlds, w and v, but having other attributes 
at w but not at v. And Quine thought those locutions no more plausible 
candidates to be part of Best Theory than the Aristotelian Essentialist locutions 
themselves ((1981a, 174)). I conclude this section by making two related 
observations. 
 
Firstly, I contend that Kripkean modal philosophy (including his version of 
possible-worlds semantics) is recognizable as actually verifying QuineÕs account 
of the commitments that are entailed by an intelligible interpretation of QML. In 
Kripke (1963) the completable versions of (normal) QMLÕs have the relevant 
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thesis of necessity of identity thesis as a theorem. Furthermore, the account of 
the logic and meaning of singular terms in Kripke (1963), and elaborated 
informally in Kripke (1980), is one that departs from the Russell-Quine project of 
introducing singular terms via definite descriptions: accordingly, it has the 
features that Quine characterizes as complications of the non-modal fragment of 
QML. Pause for thought is occasioned, perhaps surprisingly, when we come to 
consider KripkeÕs stance on the predicted commitment to the metaphysical 
doctrine of Aristotelian essentialism. For while there is, of course, happy 
deployment of essentialist locutions and endorsement of essentialist claims 
throughout Kripke (1980), I know of no place at which Kripke engages with the 
theses that are characteristic of the metaphysical doctrine of ideological modal 
realism: whether such essentialist locutions, and modal distinctions, mark 
ÒfundamentalÓ features of reality. But it is commitment to the fundamentality of 
the essentialist and the modal, in Best Theory and in reality, that Quine predicts. 
So we must settle for noting the relatively weak result that Kripkean modal 
philosophy does not conflict with this prediction. 
 
Secondly, it is prudent to isolate QuineÕs animadversions against possibilia 
(1953a) from what he counted as unwelcome commitments of embracing QML. 
There is a long story to be told here, but it might be curtailed as follows. Firstly, 
the versions of QML that Quine considered had no actuality operators: 
accordingly the formulas are not capable of expressing (directly) that there are 
things that exist but which do not actually exist. Secondly, even if a version of 
QML has that expressive power it is not obvious why acceptance of the logic 
should come with an automatic commitment to assert such sentences (under 
their intended interpretation). So it is reasonable to conclude that any alleged 
commitment to the existence of (what are really and truly called) ÒpossibiliaÓ can 
be derived from the adoption of QML only in conjunction with a great deal of 
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ideology that goes beyond a commitment to basic Aristotelian Essentialism.9 
 
 
PART III: W(h)ither Quinean ÒModal SkepticismÓ? 
 
QuineÕs modal skepticism as it has emerged thus far, is in its salient feature, 
rather orthodox. In the classical metaphysical argot, the salient feature is 
endorsement of the controversial Ð but hardly iconoclastic Ð Humean thesis that 
modality is not a feature of (fundamental) reality. One thing that distinguishes 
QuineÕs position apart from others who also assert the Humean thesis is the 
methodological basis on which he asserts it: this includes the logistical 
explication of metaphysical questions and the identification of Best Theory as the 
telling discourse. While QuineÕs methodology has, certainly, made its mark on the 
prosecution of metaphysics by the later Humeans ((Lewis (1986), Sider (2011)) it 
is not embraced wholeheartedly by them. However, I will suggest now that there 
is significantly more than this methodological variation to distinguish Quine from 
his fellow metaphysical Humeans. In order to get at the more important and far-
reaching difference, we need to be guided by two precepts.  
 
The first precept is to abandon expectation that Quine will be found saying 
anything that is more skeptical about modality than is encapsulated in the 
Humean thesis. My understanding is that the characterization of Quine as modal 
skeptic is (at least often) the consequence of what I would regard as mistakes 
that were called out in Part II. Those mistakes are to misunderstand Quine as 
having claimed that the modal notions were steeped in intractable paradox, or 
unintelligible tout court, or that QML was insusceptible to meta-logical treatment. 
                                                
9 In light of this pair of observations, one might position Williamson (2013) as 
presenting a modal philosophy that is, in may resects, Kripkean but goes further 
in embracing the fundamentality of the modal and a commitment to (what 
deserve in some respects the name of) ÒpossibiliaÓ.  
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Someone who held one of those views might naturally and justifiably be raised 
(or demoted) to the status of skeptic about modality: but Quine did not hold either 
of those views. Consequently, I think it is much more helpful, both in avoiding the 
continuation of misunderstanding and in lighting the way ahead, to abandon the 
characterization of Quine as a modal skeptic and to rebrand him (less 
extravagantly) as a modal antirealist. One part of a modal antirealist package, as 
I envisage it, is metaphysical: it is the Humean denial of the presence of modal 
features in reality. The other part of a modal antirealist package is a narrative in 
the philosophy of language (and thought): a story about the workings and 
function of modal language that complements the (negative) metaphysical thesis. 
 
The second precept is that we should not presume that there is much more to be 
had in QuineÕs corpus by way of an explicit contribution to the narrative about 
modal language that is to be integrated into the modal antirealist package. 
Accordingly, we should be prepared to extract materials from that corpus with a 
view to constructing such narrative: a narrative that is more cautiously and better 
described as ÒQuineanÓ than as ÒQuineÕsÓ. I shall make suggestions about both 
the form and content of such a Quinean modal antirealist narrative. The matter of 
form is one of deriving from QuineÕs philosophy of language the acceptability or 
otherwise of certain kinds of antirealist narrative, or paradigm. The matter of 
content is one of filling out that form, or paradigm, with the kind of material that is 
appropriate for the given the explanandum: that is, is the language of 
metaphysical modality. 
 
¤III.1 Anti-Quinean Paradigms of Antirealism 
 
In this section I shall argue that the Quinean antirealist is bound to refuse a wide 
range of well-known anti-realist paradigms and that she will naturally find 
amenable another: namely quasi-realism. In the first instance, I shall argue: (a) 
that Quine cannot be properly classified as a reductive anti-realist, nor a non-
cognitivist, nor a fictionalist, nor an error-theorist about modality, because (b) 
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these orthodox anti-realist paradigms share presumptions about meaning and 
(especially) truth which Quine is determined to refuse.10 
 
Let us begin with a two-fold proposition that all parties contract to accept Ð that 
is: (a) various token sentences are admitted as intimations of absolute and 
metaphysical modality (ÒIt is necessary that electrons are negatively chargedÓ; 
ÒWater necessarily contains HydrogenÓ, ÒHuman beings are essentially 
mammalianÓ, ÒIt is a contingent matter that the universe is law-governedÓ, etc. 
and (b) many such tokens are held true, especially in the discourse of scientific 
communities. At one end of the spectrum of philosophical reactions to this 
supposed state of affairs, we find those realists who take the modal idioms in 
question to anticipate modal features of fundamental reality. In logistical or formal 
mode, the modal locutions in question anticipate some such modal vocabulary, 
figuring primitively, in truths in (whatever is) the telling discourse. The antirealists 
deny that there are any such features of reality and undertake to supply a 
narrative, consistent with that metaphysical view, about the holding-true of such 
essentialist locutions.  
 
The first antirealist paradigm to be considered is that of analytic reductionism. 
Lewis (1986) champions the analytic reduction of the modal to the non-modal 
and he does so, partly, in support of what he regards as a distinct project of 
metaphysical reduction of the modal to the non-modal.11 But analytic reduction, 
requires a commitment to the two dogmas of empiricism that Quine (1953c) 
rejects: that is implementation of the analytic-synthetic distinction and reduction 
that proceeds sentence-by-sentence. Here I will place no weight at all on the 
                                                
10 If I am right about the paradigms, then this will constrain the form that a 
Quinean ÒskepticalÓ stance about many subject-matters can take Ð thus, for 
example: linguistic meaning, propositional attitudes and their contents.  
11 For this account of the duality of LewisÕs reductionism see Divers & Fletcher 
(2018).  
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latter dogma and keep various narratives in the game by presuming that they are 
not defeated by apparent commitment to that way of proceeding. So what puts 
analytic reduction out of the Quinean picture is commitment to the ÒanalyticÓ part: 
that involving an unexplicated conception of meaning. What makes unacceptable 
all other unacceptable antirealist paradigms is commitment to an unexplicated 
conception of truth. To maintain focus on what is generalizable, I simply mention 
and put aside the consideration that Lewisian reduction prefigures ontological 
commitment to a plenitudinous plurality of worlds. While this can hardly be 
expected to be a feature that is attractive to the Quinean, the matter is not 
straightforward and it is (in any case) presently incidental. (Divers 2007) 
 
The second antirealist paradigm is that of metaphysical reductionism, articulated 
via substantive conceptions of grounding, correspondence (of sentences with 
reality) or truth-making (see, e,g. Sider (2011)). This paradigm prompts 
immediate rejection by Quine on the grounds that it is an explicit attempt to 
explain the truth of sentences by substantial elaboration of the notion of 
correspondence. For Quine, there is no scientific merit in such correspondence 
theories of truth in general. We shall see shortly some of the reasons for his 
thinking so, the locus classicus of these being Quine (1960). For Quine (e.g. 
1970), the right kind of theory of truth is disquotational and clausal a la Tarski. 
And once we accept that, while talk of realityÕs making sentences true may 
sometimes be excused as unobjectionable realism it is always Òunhelpful realismÓ 
(1981b, 179). It is this explicit and defining feature of metaphysical reductionism 
that is presently crucial, for it is generalizable.12 As in the case of analytic 
reduction as prosecuted by Lewis there are in this case further, but presently 
incidental features of the known versions of the paradigm that are (also) 
anathema to Quine. In this case, contemporary efforts in the sphere of 
Òmetaphysical semanticsÓ direction involve commitments to hyperintensional 
Òfine-grainedÓ and Òmetaphysically explanatoryÓ devices (operators, relations 
                                                
12  
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etc.). [See Fine forthcoming] 
 
Several non-reductionist anti-realist paradigms share with metaphysical 
reductionism the (objectionable) commitment to the explanation of the truth of 
sentences by substantial elaboration of the notion of correspondence. Here I 
would cite (various versions of): non-cognitivism (expressivism), error theory and 
fictionalism.13 In any case, the point covers an anti-realist narrative of any form Ð 
call it what you will Ð that incorporates the following correspondence commitment. 
If any modal sentence is true it has to be analysable in principle Ð by traditional 
semantic analysis and/or metaphysical semantics Ð in such a way that it is 
mapped onto a fundamental state of reality (as the reductionist conceives it and 
as described in the telling narrative). In face of this correspondence conditional, 
the antirealist move is to deny the consequent: the relevant modal sentences are 
not so analysable, and so they are not true. Quine can have no more truck with 
this method when deployed in the cause of non-reductive anti-realisms than 
when deployed in the reductionist case. But the non-reductive anti-realist 
paradigms bring into consideration a feature that is non-incidental and, indeed, 
absolutely crucial to the understanding of QuineÕs rejection of the 
correspondence conceit. 
 
The antirealist paradigms cited (non-cognitivism, error theory and fictionalism) 
are faced with an urgent demand to explain the truth-indicating data that are a 
feature of every discourse. The declarative sentences that get it right, whatever 
ÒitÓ is, are called ÒtrueÓ and held true. Recall, in particular, that all parties have 
contracted to accept that there are token sentences intimating metaphysical 
modality and that some of these are held-true. The demand to explain the truth-
                                                
13 Another such paradigm that might be cited is agnosticism. But inclusion of that 
case engenders the distracting complications in exposition that are required to 
register all variants on the difference between not holding-true and holding not-
true. 
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indicating data is met in the form of appeal, in one way or another, to some 
feature (sometimes ÒnormÓ) that is subsidiary to truth (cf Wright 1992, @). For the 
discourse to be stable and workable, there has to be something to the idea that 
(on a given occasion) it there are some sentences that it is right to assent to and 
others that it is not right to assent to. For the integrity, utility and persistence of 
the practice requires that we canÕt just have a free-for-all in which anything can 
be allowed to go in judgments of whatÕs prime, or right, or in the spirit of the 
legislation, or what cannot be water. Thus we have the idea that while not hitting 
on the truth, what assenters do succeed in doing when they get it right is to hit on 
truth-in-the-fiction, or quasi-truth, or assertibility or some species of these that is 
appropriate to the particular discourse at issue.14 To Quine, such dualism about 
assent is deeply objectionable since it threatens to undermine the eligibility of the 
notion of truth to feature in an empirical semantics. The dominant Quinean 
thought in this territory will be that the empirical relevance and respectability of 
the concept of truth depends on its being bound to (observable) acts of assent, 
where these are also described as holdings-true. Truth is that which sentences 
are held to have when they are assented to. If any antirealist paradigm is going 
to be predicated on a crucial distinction between what sentences are being held 
to have when they are assented to and Genuine Truth, it must be equipped with 
a response to the imminent allegation that it is buying into a transcendent 
metaphysical notion of truth that resists explication in terms of the most natural 
empirical considerations available.15 My claim here is not that this observation 
                                                
14 Thus see, for example, we find norms other than truth coming to the fore in the 
antirealist narratives of: Mackie (1977) on morals (1977); Dennett (1981) on the 
intentional; Field (1989) on (pure) mathematics; the Wittgenstein of Kripke (1983) 
on meaning and van Fraassen (1980) on the microphysical. 
15 Davidson (1982) and Lewis (1983, 2004) are prominent philosophers who 
have followed Quine in motivating appeal to the concept of truth through the 
project of interpretation and rejecting the correspondence conceit accordingly. It 
is striking that these philosophers also give short shrift to the sorts of non-
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defeats all such anti-realist paradigms: it would be excessive to claim that there 
could never be such an adequate response and (so) that the first Quinean strike 
ought to prompt unconditional surrender. My claim, rather, is that this is the 
salient factor in explaining why a Quinean will feel perfectly justified in 
proceeding by putting such antirealist paradigms on the back-burner and seeking 
other options that do not tamper with the fundamental connection that appears 
crucial to the explication of the pre-scientific notion of truth Ð viz.: when language 
users assent to sentences, truth is what they take them, rightly or wrongly, to 
have. 
 
A Quinean modal antirealist narrative must complement the Humean denial of 
the existence of modal features of reality. What has now emerged as the salient 
desideratum is that such a narrative should further abjure the conceit that truth is 
a matter of explicable correspondence to reality. There is one paradigm of 
antirealism that fits this bill and is in many other respects Quine-friendly: that is a 
certain version of the quasi-realism introduced and commended by Blackburn 
(1984 Ch.6; 1993).16 I postpone elaboration of this claim until I am in a position to 
                                                                                                                                            
reductive antirealist paradigms that I have claimed to be dependent on the 
correspondence conceit.  
16 A word might be entered here about other paradigms of ÒantirealismÓ that 
proceed from a minimalist conception of truth, salient cases of which are 
exemplified by the positions developed by Wright (1992). This matter deserves 
much further serious investigation. But the basic feature of those positions, as I 
understand them, is that their claim of truth (minimally construed) for sentences 
of the discourse leaves no room for the denial of their being modal (moral, 
mathematical) features of the world. All that one can say is that our best 
practices in these spheres deprives the relevant judgments of objectivity where 
this does not sustain the right to say that there are no such features of the world. 
So any form of ÒantirealismÓ that has this character will not suit one, such as 
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integrate discussion of this form of antirealism with the considerations about 
content to which I now turn. 
 
¤III.2 Metaphysical Necessity at the Nexus of Similarity  
 
One piece in QuineÕs corpus that promises a great deal in the way of constructing 
an antirealist narrative for essentialist locutions is the paper ÒNatural KindsÓ 
(1969a). In that paper Quine does not deal directly with essentialist locutions. But 
what he does is to give an account of the role in scientific practice of a range of 
locutions that are closely associated with essentialist talk and he does so in a 
way that complements the Humean denial of their describing features of reality. 
The locutions in question are teleologically unified under the umbrella of the 
impeccable scientific goal of discerning the simplest, most reliable and 
projectable generalizations, of the least restricted scope, that will allow us to 
succeed in predicting experience. This is the explication of what it is to attempt to 
discover the real natures of things. The locutions in question are, firstly, those 
intimating natural kinds and subsequently, tracing connections from there others 
of law, causality, disposition and counterfactuality. The locutions in question are 
conceptually unified by their being variously related to one core notion: that of 
similarity (similarities). I will say more soon about the narrative on offer here: the 
specific story about how the locutions in question relate to the pursuit of crucial 
similarities. But the form of the present suggestion may be presented in advance. 
The thought is that if essentialist locutions can be connected appropriately to 
some or all of those other locutions that Quine has placed in the sphere of 
explication by similarity, then the kind of antirealist narrative that he offers to 
cover those might be extended to cover essentialist locutions also. In advance of 
the development of that narrative, it is also possible to discern a cluster of 
connections that have the potential to prove effective in that regard. Thus Ð for 
                                                                                                                                            
Quine as I understand him, who does wish to maintain the Humean denial of the 
presence of modal features in the world. 
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example: (i) if x is a member of kind K, x is necessarily (a) K; (ii) if P holds true 
under every counterfactual supposition whatsoever, then it is necessary that P 
and (iii) less specifically, various principles that identify as necessary features of 
things those that they have according to of the laws of nature. A final observation 
that is worth making in advance of the development of the surrounding narrative 
is this. The Quinean antirealism about modality that is in prospect is one that is 
set to be just as skeptical about modality as it is about the cognate notions of 
kind, law, causality etc. So if the prospect materializes, the right thing to say is 
that just as QuineÕs Humean antirealism about kind, law, causality etc. was not 
skeptical, neither was his Humean antirealism about necessity. Whatever 
Òskeptical paradoxÓ is afoot in any of these notions there is a Òskeptical solutionÓ 
available. As we have anticipated, such a solution is not available to the Quinean 
if it involves the dualism about assent that comes with traditional non-cognitivism 
(and other antirealist paradigms). But, as we shall now see, perhaps it need not. 
 
¤III.3 The Quinean as Modal Quasi-realist 
 
Combining the recent suggestions about the form and the content of a Quinean 
antirealist narrative about metaphysical necessity, the following proposal 
emerges: such a narrative might be constructed as part of a quasi-realist account 
of the family of non-telling scientific locutions that sustain scientific practice. The 
locutions of natural kind, causality, law, disposition, counterfactuality deserve to 
be called ÒscientificÓ because they are central to scientific practice. In particular, 
for Quine (1969a) they are part of the scientific mission of searching for, and 
exploiting, ultimate objective similarities. However, these locutions are also non-
telling because they are not elements of Best Theory. It is crucial to appreciate 
that locutions might be as deeply entrenched in science, or indispensable to 
science, in the former aspect without having any claim on a place in science in 
the latter aspect. That these locutions are classified as non-telling is what is 
required, within the explicatory conception of metaphysics, to facilitate the 
Humean denial that there are such features in reality. The quasi-realist narrative 
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will articulate the role played by these non-telling locutions in sustaining scientific 
practice. 
 
The general form of the quasi-realist narrative, or paradigm, as I would 
appropriate it from Blackburn (1984, Ch.6: 1993), has the following profile. Firstly, 
it is anti-realistic because it claims the right, against an explicatory background, 
to endorse a metaphysical position according to which reality is devoid of certain 
things or features. Secondly, it is expressivist in spirit because it embraces the 
idea that some locutions are born of the need to cope with what there really is 
rather than to copy what there really is. Thirdly, it is minimalist about truth and 
allows it to spread all across our language to the parts of it in which we are 
exercising our attempts to cope alongside our attempts to copy. Thus the conceit 
of a substantial correspondence theory of truth is abjured. Fourthly, it embraces 
the cognitive primacy of natural science. Fifthly, it is non-skeptical and non-error-
theoretic. It proceeds from the presumption that the locutions of metaphysical 
modality do not betray a failure or a mistake on our part. With this paradigm to 
hand, we then now consider how it might be applied to the language of natural 
kind, causality, law, disposition, counterfactuality and Ð extending the conceptual 
network Ð to the language of essence or metaphysical necessity. Here are some 
gestures in that direction, and some attendant caveats. 
 
The role of non-telling scientific locutions, it has been mooted, is that of 
sustaining the scientific mission of searching for and exploiting ultimate objective 
similarities. But not by providing us with what we need to state such similarities. 
For that is what is achieved in Best Theory by the telling locutions of science. Yet 
even if Ð and it is a non-trivial ÒifÓ Ð the statement of Best Theory is the ultimate 
goal of scientific theory, the language of Best Theory is too austere and remote 
from the ways in which the world strikes us, too far removed from the manifest 
image, to serve our needs to communicate: that is, our needs both to 
communicate to each other things about the world and to communicate to each 
other things about our attempts to discover those as we do in the practice of 
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science. But once freed from the correspondence conceit, and the 
unreconstructed metaphysical intuitions that sustain it, we have no need to 
demand too much of the truths that we utter in successful scientific 
communication. When we say, for example, that it is a law that all FÕs are GÕs, or 
that F-ness is counterfactually dependent on G-ness, and claim that we speak 
truly, we do not give a hostage to any project that requires that these sayings 
should be analysable in terms of, or are true in virtue of, the existence of ultimate 
objective similarities. Equally, when we say that lemons are essentially citrus 
fruits but not essentially yellow, we may speak truly by saying something that 
relates expressively to ultimate similarities other than by having the same 
semantic or metaphysical semantic content as a statement of any such 
similarities. Here is the beginning of a suggestion as to how that might be so. 
 
The use of essentialist locutions is especially congenial when scientists are 
engaged in the practice of refining and broadening the similarities that we discern 
Ð progressing from phenomenological similarity to deeper underlying similarities 
that are similarities in respect of theoretical concepts in biology, chemistry and 
physics. Thus, we come to say that lemons are essentially citrus fruits but not 
essentially yellow as our confidence increases in our progression towards the 
discovery of the real natures of things. But confidence is not something that one 
naturally expresses by stating that one has it, and so the thought emerges that 
deployment of essentialist locutions is the expressive emblem of that confidence. 
Moreover, as we learn from the moral expressivist tradition, it is doubtful that our 
useful expressions are only epiphenomenal manifestations of attitude. Especially 
when we have emphasized the needs of scientific communication, it would be 
natural to attempt to develop an appreciation of that dimension of essentialist 
commitments in which we encourage others to do something. And so we arrive at 
the proto-thought that proclaiming the necessity of lemons being citrus fruits is to 
be understood in terms of its being an expression of confidence in our being in 
the right direction of travel in the search for real natures Ð and a recommendation 
of that research programme to others.  
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For those who would pursue along such lines a non-skeptical Quinean anti-realist 
narrative about metaphysical necessity, the following caveats ought to loom large. 
Firstly, we already have evidence that some ways of explicating metaphysical 
necessity via appeal to similarity have been rejected by Quine: thus his (1981c) 
critique of a (non-standard) analysis of necessity de re in terms of counterparts 
Secondly, the elaboration of modal quasi-realism offered by Blackburn (1986) 
suggests that there may indeed be something special Ð and especially bad Ð 
about modal commitments. This relates to the conditions under which we acquire 
modal beliefs rather than those (as described above) under which we manifest 
them and the prospect of a deep incompatibility between modalizing and 
naturalism. Thirdly, the preliminary explorations of Quine (1969a) do not suggest 
that all locutions of dispositionality, counterfactuality etc. can be vindicated by 
establishing appropriate relations to the quest for ultimate objective similarities. 
So it would be prudent to hope for such vindication of only some, rather than all, 
essentialist locutions that philosophers would promote.  
 
¤IV Prologue 
 
I am more sanguine about the consideration of Quine as a modal quasi-realist 
than I am about getting at metaphysical necessity through considerations about 
ultimate objective similarity. But I am most sanguine of all about our learning 
more about modality by continuing to study Quine in a constructive spirit than we 
do by putting aside his work as outdated and barren modal skepticism and 
looking elsewhere.  
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